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with their own coherence. Nonetheless, cultural practice is ultimately disorderly; for it is Protean in dimension and influenced by incalculable variables. In early modernity, the new and crucial variable was commercialization: culture could be purchased and thus loosed from any tight relationship with class. Almost everythingfood and drink, education and books, paintings and ornamental shrubs, theater and music-was on the market. In effect, culture became increasingly a matter of choice and hence susceptible to myriad combinations that correlated imperfectly with income and station. Across income and station boundaries, moreover, culture was loosed from mundane social rhythms to become a matter of private recreation and conscious cultivation. The publishing information I cited in my opening statements may be evidence of macro-social integration through literacy and print networks. Yet the thousands of titles in expanding categories intimate a kaleidoscope of writers and readers ever rearranged (and shaken apart) by ambition, imagination, value, and taste.
Because cultural practices (and economic and political practices as well) resist synoptic treatment, the search for integration in the early modern world entails problems. These are partly, as Lieberman notes, problems of exclusion and emphasis. Concentrating on large patterns of consolidation that anticipate national formation, he elides both the many actors who were not party to various changes (such as subsistence farmers, the almost totally illiterate population of women) and the many competing movements that did not survive modernization (such as a militantly anti-market agrarianism). Lieberman's followers must be lumpers rather than splitters who risk confusing dominance with universality.
But the greater problem, within the context of Lieberman's argument itself, is a temptation toward flatness and away from depth of field. Once we acknowledge that the very process of consolidation involved a twin process of fragmentation, we need a stereoscopic version of change. If we foreground integrating developments, we must do so in a fashion that keeps in view a background of multiplying differences. How we are to do this is the challenge of Lieberman's project.
Let me note, incidentally, that attention to the remorseless complexity of early modern culture precludes any simple contrast with the medieval past. However attractive, a contrast between medieval fracture and early modern cohesion in cultural practice cannot be 55?
MARY ELIZABETH BERRY conduct-from marriage ritual to calligraphic style. Whatever standardization we choose to stress may bear lightly on lived experience; for small variations may form the greatest divides. Can we know what really unites and divides peoples?
As Liberman notes, we tend to glimpse cultural solidarity-and thus what seemingly unites a group-in moments of crisis, particularly foreign crisis. Yet as he also notes, such glimpses are distorted; for crisis invites an uncommon concealment of differences. Just as important, the face of solidarity is usually the face projected by holders of power. Is chauvinistic rallying a test of common culture?
If there are profound bonds of culture, then, the historian's search for them is troubled. Evidence is variously elusive or deceptive.
Apparent convergence may mask the fine divergences that matter more. And, in the end, even full conformity in cultural practice tells us little about cultural consciousness: a sameness in behavior is hardly equivalent to a shared mentality-to a sense of common culture.
I raise these concerns not to disable inquiry, but to recommend alternative directions and modest goals. Because behavior is hard to track in the aggregate and harder to evaluate as binding or dividing, I would shift the emphasis to thought, and thus search the sources for common mental habits-and orientations-that might underlie differences in experience. Because written sources are partial in reach and myriad in meaning, I would resign any quest for inclusive representations of society or active demonstrations of consciousness. Although cultural 'standardization' seems to me beyond historical proof, we can usefully explore novel ways of thinking that may have gradually, unconsciously connected people.
III. Does the Early Modern Experience Really Matter? (Or, Thoughts About Continuity and Rupture in Culture)
Professor Lieberman trains his gaze on early modernity because he finds in that period a movement away from medieval fragmentation and toward an integration that anticipates modern statehood. In effect, he emphasizes a break between the medieval and early modern experiences and a continuity between the early modern and modern experiences. We might easily reverse the emphases. I linger over the point since our attention to early modernity requires some groundwork-some comparison with preceding and succeeding eras.
If we retain a high and external perspective, pre-LiebermanJapan (or Japan before 1400) might look reasonably well integrated. The ocean, which acted more as a barrier than a connective artery, formed outer boundaries that were assailed regularly by piracy but rarely by invasion. (The Mongol incursions of the late thirteenth century drewJapan into foreign war for the first time in at least six centuries.) Immigration was not substantial after the early classical period; diplomatic contact remained intermittent; and a distinctive vernacular language, however various its dialects, separated Japan from neighbors.8 The commonalities resulting from such isolating factors were amplified by material culture. Housing was overwhelmingly detached and single-story wooden construction (because of the threat of earthquake); the diet was dominated by sea products and grains (because limitations on arable land precluded the pasturage of animal herds); the penetration of wet rice agriculture promoted sedentary and interdependent communal formation, discouraged the growth of slavery, and disseminated a common agrarian technology across the three main islands.9
In politics, moreover, the centralizing disciplines of the classical state (c. 710-1185), though much altered by episodic civil war and the maturation of shogunal rule, exerted an influence throughout the medieval period (1185-1467). An ancient monarchy continued as the font of legitimate authority; rank and title derived from courtly practice; space was ordered by the classical system of provinces, districts, and highways; taxation remained focused on grain and labor; classical legal traditions and habits of litigation persisted.
Across classes, genealogy defined status and inheritance conveyed property as well as profession. Blood was identity. A stem family system organized kindred more insistently than extended or clan systems.10 Buddhism, supported by the state and prevalent among the aristocracy from the eighth century, had spread widely by the late medieval period. Although always a manifold phenomenon (for there are many Buddhisms and many interweavings of Shinto and other MARY ELIZABETH BERRY traditions), the Buddhist presence quickly affected the national landscape, where temples became the major monuments, as well as the conduct of death, for cremation became the normal manner of interment. Buddhism also legitimated the life of the road.
Perhaps the most significant social movement in pre-Lieberman Japan was the penetration of the country by medieval itinerants. They came in many forms: they were preachers and healers, entertainers and prostitutes, pilgrims and monks soliciting donations to temples. Yet virtually all who left a trace in the record shared a Buddhist identity conveyed by tonsures or robes or names or professed affiliations. These many men and women, all outside society but accorded licence by the Buddhist markings, were the vehicles of cultural integration at the time. They proselytized a vernacular Buddhism, transmitted a popular literature focused on tales of the Genpei war (1180-85), established a repertoire of miracle stories, helped routinize the rituals of death, and carried news across borders. l
The experience in pre-LiebermanJapan of foreign encounter (and hence of an alterity that may have shaped national consciousness) was a paradoxical one. In one sense, China saturatedJapan: its written language, polity, religions, material and high culture inflected all aspects of the classicalJapanese state and retained an influence in the medieval era. A China-consciousness is intense in all scholarly writing (much of it written in Chinese), and conspicuous in much of the tale literature that circulated orally.
Nonetheless, the Chinese presence was tempered by two considerations. First, Chinese forms tended to be altered inJapan and thus to assume putatively native shape. (Even the Chinese language used in Japan for formal writing took on numerous native variants.) Second, the physical-rather than the intellectual-presence of China and the Chinese was rare. From neither side of the Japan Sea was there any unflagging impetus toward diplomacy, settlement, combat, or commerce (with the exception of the piracy that influenced China and Korea more gravely than Japan). Sixteen diplomatic missions went from Japan to China between 607 and 838, for example, but were then discontinued until 1404. Post-Lieberman Japan deserves remark as well. Despite the integration I have just imputed to the period before 1400, and despite the gains I shall eventually claim for early modernity, the evidence for the Meiji era (1868-1912) indicates that the new state regarded the work of integration as barely begun. To an extent never before seen in Japan, political disciplines-largely responsive to perceived foreign threats-became the medium of cultural refashioning. Meiji leaders focused on the creation and projection of a national government that had been, if not exactly weak, at least concealed in the Tokugawa period (1600-1868). And much of this labor was necessarily cultural in emphasis: the display of the monarch on train platforms across the country; the invention of anthems and flags and state rituals; the establishment of telegraphs, newspapers, and radio networks to carry information and propaganda; the design of a public school system to nourish good subjects, pliable conscripts, and willing industrial workers; the formation of a state Shinto cult to instil reverence for emperor and nation. The work of nationalism, and the creation of its essentially new symbols, was the work of Meiji. Second, given the presumption that some premodern experiences must have been reasonably significant, the isolation of those experiences remains a tough and probably impressionistic job. I have noted already that a certain commonality in language did not preclude convulsions over a standard dialect. We might wonder whether any earlier developments could have prepared for the sundering of a state Shinto cult from Buddhism, or whether the popular adoption of samurai styles was not reproached by the modern injunctions to cut hair, store swords, and learn to waltz.
These are cautionary observations. In entering the world of Lieberman proper, I am wary of discovering a cultural convergence that we Berkeley, 1986 . For discussion of the transition, see Marius Jansen and Gilbert Rozman,Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton, 1986). At another level, comparison leads Lieberman to (at least) three statements about the trajectories of his rimlands: parallel forms of national integration occurred during a (very roughly) synchronized period that we might call early modernity; such integration seems to have resulted from some similar causes that, though partly internal, were substantially external as well; and, finally, such historical commonalities militate against any binary formulations of separate eastern and western development. But, however cogent at a magisterial level of generality, each of these claims poses problems that Lieberman is the first to acknowledge. For starters, the time-frame of analysis, which exceeds four centuries, is exceptionally elastic. The causal elements are also numerous and dependent: neither an independent variable nor a stable mix of prime factors accounts persistently for the commonalities Lieberman discovers. Thus, the prolonged peace and relative isolation of early modern Japan seem to have achieved results comparable to the periodic wars and international exposure of early modern France. Another difficulty is the loose standard of comparison among the six sample countries: the increasing 'integration' claimed for each of the rimlands had locally disparate manifestations and even more disparate limits. If the Burmese and Russian polities assumed such different shapes, have we gained more than a superficial insight by noting their shared concern with centralization?
To overcome caution in the face of such difficulties, and hence join the macro-historical enterprise, we need a clear purpose. Here Professor Lieberman wavers. Sometimes he asks us to look for 'Eurasian interdependence'-to gaze beyond borders at a Eurasia that formed an 'evolving, loosely integrated system' or an 'interactive, loosely synchronized ecumene.' But this project is compromised by Lieberman's attention to discrete local histories, and to their powerful interior as well as exterior imperatives. Eurasia finally looms less large than six countries that were variously embarked on the transition to modern nationhood. In effect, Lieberman's enterprise does seem a 'neo-modernization project'-a quest for the common origins, in Asia as well as Europe, of durable nation states.
We are closer, then, but not close enough, to a well-defined outcome. Like the term 'integration,' 'nation state' is the loosest of common standards of analysis. Even if we grant this denomination to the gang of six, their modern histories diverge wherever we lookwhether at political form or philosophy, legal structure, economic organization, military power, colonial experience.... So one possible promise of the Lieberman project-that a roughly common course of development might produce states of a certain kind-seems thwarted. Just how, then, are the rimlands comparable? And what are we seeking in their early modern experiences that might account for that comparability? I think Professor Lieberman reveals his answers in a discussion of the differences between archipelagic and mainland Southeast Asia.
[I]t seems to me ... that in today's Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam state authority rests on the loyalty of a paramount ethnic group in a fashion very different from anything found in Indonesia-and that this has major implications for anti-colonial legacies. ... In large part, this discrepancy reflects the fact that lowland peoples on the mainland had a long-standing relation to stable state traditions which the Europeans were obliged to respect in their triparite division of the mainland-but which had no counterpart in the archipelago....17
Lieberman's concern here is nationalism. Unlike the arbitrarily (or colonially) formed countries of the archipelago, the mainland coun-17 Lieberman, this volume. 
Summary and Subject
Professor Lieberman invites me, I conclude, to explore the development in early modernJapan of a proto-nationalism, or, more loosely, of the antecedents of a national identity. Was there some construction of peoplehood (or some experience of cultural integration) that was yoked to a stable polity? My task is complicated by the scruples apparent in my introductory questions. Because I find cleavage inherent to early modernity, it seems misguided to find integration in either the transcendence of differences (through a common parent language or grain regime, for example) or the erosion of differences (through the dissemination of literacy or the samurai style, for example). Although persuasive in general terms, both approaches are forms of denial: they presume the superiority of centripetal over centrifugal forces in human affairs. They also have limited explanatory power. Transcendence invokes commonalities too lofty for routine application. Erosion tends to blur one boundary only to clarify another.
Hence, I duck the search for a cultural integration that occurs when similarity surpasses difference. I am concerned, rather, with how difference gets managed. My subject is the integrative principles that can connect necessarily different units in society-the ideas or mental habits that permit fragmented units to situate themselves in a whole. The effect of such integration will not be cultural unity or alikeness. It can only be the crafting of workable relationships.
The integrative principles at work in earlyJapan seem to me best revealed in an extraordinary body of printed material that I call 'public information.' This material was part of a publishing explosion that began, by the 164os, in the three great cities (Kyoto, Edo, Osaka) and then spread to commercial concerns across the country.18 The Edo publishers' list for 1696, with its 7,800 titles, intimates the dimensions of the enterprise. Religion, philosophy, history, and fiction commanded large places in the industry, but informative and instructional works assumed an increasingly strong position. They ranged from sheet maps and atlases to encyclopedias, word dictionaries, biographical dictionaries, personnel registers, rural gazetteers, urban directories, travel guides, agrarian manuals, surveys of any manner of specialties (from gardening to sericulture), evaluations of professional services (from prostitution to Confucian teaching), and a vast assortment of texts for the education of the young. This explosion in information was new. It was linked to printing but not to technological discovery. Virtually all commercial printers continued to use the ancient art of woodblock, which was employed in Japan continuously from the seventh century for small editions of Buddhist works. Although movable type fascinated publishers in the early seventeenth century, the aesthetics and economies of woodblock prevailed.'9 Rather than technology, then, printing responded to a variety of social imperatives in the early modern world, including a literate market and the ambitions of new, often professional writers. And, in turn, the market and the writers responded to the burgeoning of print.
A similar push-pull effect operated in the area of literacy. The printing industry presumed the healthy readership provided by multiple large cities, even as books stimulated the growth of ever larger readerships. The larger publishers opened provincial branches and significantly expanded their networks through loans: book stores also operated as lending libraries; itinerant lenders with books strapped to their backs worked the village market.
Within the expansive world of early modern print, my emphasis falls on the texts of public information for several reasons. First, they probably reached the reading majority as well as large circles of listeners and recipients of second-and third-hand intelligence. In so far as written materials moved beyond a literate minority to approach anything like common circulation, the information sources provide our surest link between textual and popular cultures. Indeed, they were produced in astonishing volume. Tens of thousands of domestic maps from the Tokugawa period survive today, for example, suggesting that in both productivity and varietyJapan was one of the most active mappers among all early modern countries. Further, I concentrate on the texts of public information because their content engaged and organized mundane experience. I focus in this essay on three particular genres in the information category: cartography, travel guides, and urban directories. In each case, the sources resonate with broad social movements and political disciplines to suggest some consonance between their printed messages and practical modes of knowledge. They may point to a culture that was not monopolized by readers alone.
Before I turn to the texts, their context must concern us. It is there that the conditions of change come clearer. And it is there that we discover the integral structures of polity and economy, crucial to the Lieberman project, that shaped cultural exchange.
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Contexts: Japan c. 1460-1800
Internal Perspectives
The formative experience of early modern Japan was civil war, which raged from 1467 until 1590 (or 1615, if we include two final battles over succession). Although local combat had not been uncommon after looo, sustained and country-wide upheaval was rare. The upheaval after 1467 rose from dense troubles-from conflicts between urban usurers and rural borrowers, from predatory forms of absentee proprietorship, from the exhaustion of a manorial landholding system without margins for continued extraction and expansion. The upheaval took the form of political rebellion-of breakaway movements for local autonomy that encompassed the martial elite, then minor magnates, and eventually village and sectarian communities.21
As cleavages in the medieval polity spread, two alternative patterns of rule began, haltingly, to emerge: the consolidation of small territorial units (previously a patchwork of manorial jurisdictions) into integral domains that were governed-through force and administrative innovation-by daimyo lords; and the denial of all overlordship by self-governing leagues of farmers and village soldiers, religious sectarians, and urban commoners. This economic change in the domains was accompanied by political initiatives. The most ambitious daimyo registered and systematically taxed agrarian properties. They imposed domainal-wide codes of law; they integrated both monasteries and towns into their jurisdictions. The process was jagged. It was also volatile. Daimyo rose and fell in a constantly changing mudscape. The domainal model of rule, nonetheless, proved tenacious, crushing brutally the defiant leagues.
I call civil war the formative experience of early modernity for (at least) two reasons. First, it shaped the domains that became the basic governing units in a national federation established around 1590 by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and led by the Tokugawa house from 1600 to 1868. Hideyoshi's settlement brought roughly 2oo semiautonomous domains into a federal form of union. (The number would increase to over 250 under Tokugawa rule.) Second, the length and gravity of wartime upheaval inspired a polity fixated on peace-keeping.
The Toyotomi and the early Tokugawa used central authority with singular audacity but precise target to cut the roots of turmoil. They disarmed farmers, monks, and townspeople; they leveled fortifications. They removed most samurai from villages to the castle towns of their daimyo, where they became underemployed peacetime stipendiaries. They forbade changes in class and station, monitored physical movement, disciplined belligerent monastic establishments. By 1640, moreover, they had heavily constrained foreign contact.23
Let me emphasize the audacity of these measures. The emphasis would hardly seem necessary except that fifteen generations of Tokugawa rule saw few substantial advances on these central powers and, indeed, several retreats. This situation moves Professor Lieberman to remark upon the limits of political integration in early modern Japan, and many scholars to regard shogunal governance as weak.24 Without rejecting such observations, it seems well to offer modifications. First, the shogun (and, more important, the deputies to whom power devolved by administrative design) maintained for 250 years the most far-reaching polity Japan had known. They protected a In judging the importance of foreign contact to Japan across these periods, the value of trade itself has served as one too obvious-and misleading-a measure. In wartime as in peacetime, trade centered on the exchange of Chinese silks (thread, floss, raw and finished fabrics) for Japanese metals (first copper ore, then, overwhelmingly, silver). When China relations were broken for a time after 1550, disparate Asian and European merchants carried the continental silks to Japan. But while this trade was certainly heavier than any earlier exchange, efforts to calculate its annual value in the fat years of the seventeenth century have reached modest verdicts: Conrad Totman concludes that imports may have had 'a value equivalent to less than 1.5 percent of domestic agricultural production.'30 Seemingly limited in value, the trade was also suicidal. It depleted metal resources virtually to the break point, when domestic clamor forced curtailment of silver exports. A silver flow of immense importance to Eurasia as a whole was damaging to Japan.3' We might better gauge foreign impact, however, by considering the general circulation of both goods and ideas and their rippling consequences. The above account is heedless, for example, of the multiplying effects in Japan of major imports and exports: Chinese silks organized the luxury textile market, as silver demand organized a huge mining industry, until the late seventeenth century. The account is also heedless of the disproportionate importance of commerce to its main parties: trade income loomed large, for example, to the early shogun who licenced Japanese mariners, created a silk thread monopoly, and controlled the mines.32 More critical, though, is attention to the many items, and the even greater knowledge, that bore lightly on trade accounts but heavily on social change.
In wartime, European arms (copied inJapan by the 155os but fired with imported saltpeter) profoundly altered combat and mercilessly increased casualties, thus hastening the peace. Chinese mining technologies accelerated recovery of the mineral resources indispensable to war's victors. And Chinese coins fed monetization of the market (even as they deferred intensive domestic minting).33 In peacetime, a range of introduced products became agrarian staples-the sweet potato above all, as well as South Asian cotton and new world tobacco, for example. The books and objects funneled through Nagasaki were conduits of cartographic and optical science, medical and botanical knowledge, painting and pottery styles, philosophical and historical ferment.34
This catalog, though perfunctory, begins to suggest the intricate and incalculable effects of overseas connection. None of these effects was definitive of war or peace, nor were they collectively greater in force than the Chinese impact on classical and medievalJapan. But such comparisons lead in futile directions. Consider the hypothetical Japanese farmer of early modernity who grew cotton, raised her children on Confucian primers, and wore spectacles to refill her pipe. Here 'foreign' elements have become part of a normal domestic order virtually unimaginable without them. This form of encounter had very old traditions in aJapan never sealed from influence. Again, a Eurasian 'interdependency' is hard to claim. A great permeability, and a steady adaptation of culture, is patently clear.
Was The shogunate's attention to ideology raises a larger subject, and the one most germane to the Lieberman project: the relationship between foreign affairs and state formation. At the simplest level, the control of contact-through licences, laws, monopolies, and force-served a legitimating function important to military leaders since the thirteenth century. Although state-to-state relations were secured only with Korea (after 1636), foreign consent to Japanese policy identified the hegemons as protectors of the realm.36 This role was not new, but both its Eurasian scope and its superior tone were. As Professor Lieberman notes, a once deferential posture toward China gave way to a chauvinism that would inflect historical writing and philosophy as well.37 The international order was now wide, and Japan's position in it was unbowed.
For a while, Japan's position was also bellicose. After threatening to invade both Taiwan and the Philippines, Toyotomi Hideyoshi twice sent invading armies to Korea in the 1590S with the ultimate intention of 'entering China, spreading the customs of our country to the four hundred and more provinces of that country, and establishing there the government of our own imperial city unto all the ages.'38 Ruinous to Korea, the invasions failed-but without closing the possibility of resumed Japanese aggression in Asia. The Tokugawa shogun contemplated war with the Manchus on the Korean peninsula in the 162os, and war with the Spaniards in Manila during the 163os.39 They were already waging the equivalent of war on Christians in Japan. Some 3,000 local converts and foreign mission- 
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These remarks move us from the international to the domestic arena, and from state policy to social change. The Tokugawa experience was structured by remarkable statist initiatives: federation, seclusion, class laws, the transfer of samurai to cities, the requirement that daimyo reside periodically in Edo. But the Tokugawa experience was also redefined daily by both the unforeseen effects of these initiatives and the dynamic responses of many actors.
Cultural Integration
My survey of the early modern context in Japan has emphasized integrity in structure. Yet as I begin the discussion of culture, let me return to my opening theme. Tokugawa governance was predicated on differences-on making them and enforcing them. Distinctions of class were primary-ordained in laws covering everything from residence and land ownership to dress and drink. Differences were also elaborated officially among religious organizations, schools and academies, even theatrical troupes and highway lodgings.45 And differences were amplified not only by such deep structures as gender and geography but also by economic specialization and cultural choice.
As I suggested earlier, integration in a society of difference could not occur primarily through the erosion or transcendence of boundaries. Rather, integration required workable principles of relationship between disparate social units. Some such principles appear in the texts of public information generated by the publishing explosion. I turn to them now to explore culture as an expression of social connection. Distinctly early modern sources, the texts belong to the sphere of entrepreneurship. If Meiji leaders were obsessed with the mission of nationalist indoctrination, the Tokugawa authorities were a distant party to the work of cultural integration. duration, close and distant in intensity. Hence, early modernity sees not just multiplying difference but multiplying relationships. These relations, many of them ambivalent, do not constitute some organic social union. The directories break down totalizing conceptions of community to replace them with a pluralist and dynamic sociology. But precisely because of this pluralism and dynamism, individuals can construct the diverse ties that make societies resilient.
Concluding Thoughts
Resilience was one of the primary characteristics of Japan's transition from the Tokugawa to the Meiji periods. The polity broke while society did not. Civil wars over the locus and exercise of power led neither to anarchy nor to a pathological immobility. The resources for survival are impossible to calculate well. The vitality of a 'proto-national consciousness' may be as apt a summary as any of the psychological resources that were surely indispensable. But I am reluctant to assign any particular content to that consciousness, and even more reluctant to cast it in universal or salutary terms. So I have searched the archive of public information less for belief systems than for durable mental habits that might have encouraged notions of relationship, and thus cohesion, in society.
In cartography, I found a structural imagination that required the classification and integration of parts. The map constructs a bounded and labeled physical world (The Great Japan, for example); transforms discrete experience into generic categories (political roles, class identities, economic sectors, communications arteries); and then assembles all parts into a unified system of natural and social geography. Although they may indoctrinate readers with particular cultural visions, maps also teach habits of orientation-of generic analysis and holistic conception-that are adaptable to changing geographies. In the guide literature to 'famous places,' I found the appropriation of a putatively common history and shared landscape. The guides take countless monuments-humble and heroic, closed and open to view-and make them mentally accessible to a 'public' assumed to want, and deserve, such access. Although they may celebrate particular iconic sites, guides also teach habits of popular cultural proprietorship. And in urban directories, I found a pluralist sociology that reflected both intense social differentiation and multiple social connections. The directories expose the plural identities
